Abstract. The application area of security protocols raises several problems that are relevant to automated deduction. We describe in this note some of these challenges.
Introduction
Security protocols are small distributed programs, aiming at securely achieving some transaction, while relying on a public or a non-reliable network. Getting formal guarantees that such protocols satisfy their specifications is an important issue, because of the numerous applications and the economical and societal impact of potential failures.
Program testing is irrelevant in this context, because of the malicious nature of attacks. On the opposite, security protocols constitute an ideal field of applications for research in automated deduction: the protocols are small, as well as their specification, yet their verification is non-trivial. The purpose of this note is to show several interesting issues in automated deduction, which are raised by this verification problem.
We will focus on problems that can (or could) be formulated in first-order logic or equational logic. Already in early works, first-order clausal formalisms have been used for security protocols [45] and intruder capabilities formalized using term rewriting systems [47] . Since then, there has been a large amount of work in the area, which we do not survey here (in particular many relevant references are certainly missing). Despite this research, there are still open questions, some of which are described in this note.
We will organize the note stepwise, starting with the most elementary notions (intruder deduction) in section 2 and enrich the model in further sections, each time reporting some unsolved problem. In section 3, we consider the security problem for a fixed number of protocol sessions. In section 4, we consider resolution-based theorem proving applied to security protocols. In section 5, we consider security properties that are usually defined as indistinguishability between two processes. Finally, we consider modularity issues in section 6.
Intruder deductions
The security of a protocol depends on several inputs: the protocol, the security property, but also the intruder capabilities and the (assumed) algebraic properties of the security primitives. We assume that F is a set of function symbols representing all security primitives and data. A is a set of equations, typically associativity and commutativity of some symbols in F and R is a rewrite system, convergent modulo A capturing the expected computations on messages. A typical rule in R would be dec(enc(x, y), y −1 ) → x. In the simplest setting, we only consider offline attacks: we forget how an attacker got messages and simply assume (s)he holds a set of messages. In addition, we only consider security properties that can be modeled as the confidentiality of some piece of a message.
We also assume here that the security primitives, such as encryption algorithms, do not leak any information besides what is modeled through the algebraic properties: we consider a formal model, that is sound with respect to the computational one.
In such a (restricted) case, security is an Entscheidungsproblem for a particular deduction system, representing the attacker computing capabilities. We let F pub be the subset of F consisting of public symbols. Messages are represented as terms in the algebra T (F) (or possibly a quotient T (F)/ = A ) and the inference rules are of the form
The attacker may apply the function f ∈ F pub to messages s 1 , . . . , s n , getting f (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ↓, the normal form of f (s 1 , . . . , s n ) with respect to R. Example 1. The most typical example is the perfect cryptography, for symmetric encryption. F pub contains pairing: < s 1 , s 2 > is the pair of the two terms s 1 , s 2 , encryption: {s} k is the encryption of s with k, decryption dec, projections π 1 , π 2 and some public constants. F = F pub ∪ S where S is a set of (secret) constants, disjoint from F pub . A is empty and the rewrite system consists of three rules:
Many examples of (other) relevant equational theories and rewrite systems are given in [33] .
The set of inference rules needs not be finite, as, for variadic symbols (or associative-commutative symbols), we may want one version of the rule for each value of n. It is also convenient sometimes to consider combinations of function symbols instead of a single function application.
Also note the resulting term f (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ↓ is assumed to be a message: the set of messages M is a subset of T (F) (or T (F)/ = A ) and a valid instance of the rule assumes that both the premisses and the conclusion are in M . For instance, in example 1, terms in M do not contain the symbols dec, π 1 , π 2 and, if the decryption does not succeed, the attacker does not learn anything about the plaintext.
The set of inference rules yields a deducibility relation ⊆ 2 M × M , using repeatedly the inference rules from an initial knowledge H ⊆ 2 M . In most relevant cases, as shown in [29] , an equivalent inference system can be obtained by "inlining" the rewriting rules applications, getting rid of the normalization symbol; the rewriting steps in the conclusion are replaced with finitely many patterns in the premisse. In example 1, we would get the following inference rules:
Definition 1. Given an intruder deduction system, the deducibility problem is, given a finite subset H of M and a term s ∈ M , to decide whether H s.
This may also be formulated using rewriting systems: if we let H = {t 1 , . . . , t n } and σ be the substitution {x 1 → t 1 , . . . , x n → t n }, the problem is equivalent to:
Now, what is a bit surprising at first sight is that many of such intruder deduction systems have very nice properties: the deducibility problem is in PTIME. This relies on a subformula property of the deduction system: if the function symbols applications are gathered together in an appropriate way, then for any deducible s, there is a proof in which intermediate steps belong to St(s, H), the subterms of the hypotheses and the conclusion. In such a case, we say that the deduction system is local, following [44] . Then, if one step deduction is itself decidable in PTIME, the deducibility problem can be reduced to a simple fixed point computation of the deducible subterms.
Such a locality theorem has been established for many examples of intruder deduction systems, for instance perfect cryptography, for symmetric and asymmetric encryption and signatures, commutative encryption, ECB and CBC encryption modes, blind signatures, exclusive or [22] , Abelian groups [21] , modular exponentiation, and others [35, 19] . Actually, each time a new protocol is designed, which relies on a new equational theory, a new locality result is established.
Instead of repeating the work for each new theory, we wish to get a more general result. This raises the following challenge:
Challenge 1 For which classes of (AC)-rewrite systems, do we get a locality property? A decidable deducibility problem?
Related works
There are actually some works [30, 5] , answering, at least partly, this question, when A is empty. Many examples however involve associative and commutative symbols. So, the above challenge can be seen as extending these results to the AC case.
[8] also provides with a general criterion, amenable to automated locality proofs. First, locality is generalized, replacing the subterm relation with any well-founded ordering: St(s, H) above is replaced with the set of terms that are smaller than s, H. Of course, if we want to derive a decision procedure, this set must be finite. Next, they show that non-local inference systems can be completed into local ones, using ordered resolution (saturated sets are local). However, this process may not terminate. That is what happens when, in our applications, A is not empty. Typically, we need to deal with infinitely many clauses of the form I(x 1 ), . . . , I(x n ) → I(x 1 + . . . + x n ) when + is associative and commutative. Answering the challenge along this line of research would require to extend the results of [8] to some class of infinite sets of clauses.
Other interesting issues
Another related problem is the combination of intruder theories: If the deducibility problem is decidable for two intruder theories, under which condition is it decidable in the union of the two theories ? Similar questions may be asked for local theories. This is an important issue when the deduction system is large. For instance in [19] , the authors consider an intruder deduction system, which includes several associative-commutative symbols and a lot of rules. This system formalizes some arithmetic properties, which must be considered in the model, since they are used by the participants of an actual electronic purse protocol. The locality proof of [19] is a direct (tedious) proof and would benefit from combination results.
There is a combination result in the disjoint case [7] , however not applicable to the above example.
Bounded number of sessions
Now, we enrich the model, considering some active attacks: the attacker may not only perform offline deductions, but also send fake messages and take advantage of the reply. We assume however that he can send only a fixed number of such messages (this number is given as a parameter).
One of the main problems, which yields "man-in-the-middle attacks" such as the famous attack of [42] , is that pieces of messages cannot be analysed by some honest parties, hence could be replaced by arbitrary messages.
Example 2. An honest agent a generates a random number n and sends it, together with his identity, encrypted with the public key of another honest agent b. Such a message can be represented as {< a, n >} pub(b) , a (ground) term in our algebra T (F). However, b's view is different. Upon receiving this message, (s)he decrypts and finds a pair, whose second component is an arbitrary message. Suppose that b has to send back {< b, n >} pub(a) , the corresponding rule for b will be:
Upon receiving any {< x, y >} pub(b) reply by sending {< b, y >} pub(x) , maybe after checking that x is the identity of somebody with whom b is willing to communicate.
The important issue here is that y can be replaced by any message and the attacker may take advantage of this.
Hence, a simple class of protocols can be defined by finitely many roles, which are again finite sequences of rules s ⇒ t, meaning that, upon reception of a message sσ, the agent replies tσ. In general, each role also generates new names (keys or nonces) and may have a more complex control structure, for instance specifying what to do when the message does not match the expected s. In this section, we will not consider replication of the roles, hence new names can simply be distinguished using distinct constants and we only consider a simple linear structure of the control. Even more, by guessing an ordering between the different actions of each role, we get a sequence s i ⇒ t i of query ⇒ response (such as {< x, y >} pub(b) ⇒ {< b, y >} pub(x) in example 2),
In this setting, there is an attack on the secrecy of s, if there is a substitution σ such that
where S 0 is the set of initial intruder knowledge and s is the data supposed to remain secret. s 1 σ, . . . , s n σ are the successive (fake) messages constructed by the attacker and t 1 σ, . . . , t n σ are the successive messages sent by the agents. The left members of the deducibility constraints increase as the attacker's gets new messages from the network. Without the last constraint, there is a trivial substitution σ 0 , corresponding to the normal execution of the protocol, in which the attacker simply forwards the messages without modifying them : s i+1 σ 0 = t i σ 0 for every i < n. Equivalently, we can define an attack using term rewriting systems: there is an attack if there are terms ζ 0 , . . . , ζ n ∈ T (F pub ∪ S 0 , {x 1 , . . . , x n }) and a substitution σ such that
. . , ζ n are the recipes, which constitute the attacker's strategy: they specify how to combine the known messages to produce the next fake message.
Deciding if there is an attack consists then in deciding whether such a substitution σ exists. This problem has been shown to be in NP for a number of intruder theories [49, 23, 22, 21, 46] .
There are also a number of results for classes of theories, for instance: subterm theories [11] and monoidal theories [37] . This does not cover however some relevant examples such as the one described in [19] .
In most (if not all) these results, the key is a small attack property (also called conservativity in e.g. [37] ): if there is an attack then there is an attack, which is built, stacking pieces of protocol rules. Then, the search space for σ becomes finite, yielding decision algorithms.
This property is not well-understood; the existence of small attacks can be recasted as the existence of particular (small) proofs: there should be proof simplification rules, which justify such a property. This yields the following challenge:
Challenge 2 Give a proof-theoretic explanation of the small attack property.
Related work
A partial answer is given in [14] : the authors give proof simplification rules, which are strongly normalizing. The normal proofs only correspond to small attacks. However, this work only covers a restricted class of intruder deduction rules, assuming A is empty, as well as additional syntactic restrictions.
An approach along the lines of [8] does not work here: the clausal formalisation of the protocol rules introduces some over-approximations, as explained in the next section.
Other interesting issues
Again, combination of decision procedures for a bounded number of sessions is an important issue, as, in general, many protocols are running at the same time on the same device. This problem is addressed in [24, 25] , but there are still examples of relevant complex equational theories that cannot (and should) be broken into pieces using these results (see e.g. [19] ). Hence, there is still some work to be done in this area. (See also section 6 for the general modularity problem, when the number of sessions is unbounded.)
Clausal theorem proving and security protocols
In the automated deduction community, it has become a habit to recast all decision results as terminating resolution strategies [39] . This allows in principle to use a single clausal theorem prover for any of the particular decision problems. What about the decision results of the last section? This will be our next challenge, but let us first introduce and clarify the problems.
There are several formalizations of security protocols within first-order logic. After C. Meadows [45] , C. Weidenbach in [50] was one of the first who observed that resolution methods are quite successful in this area. Then the security analyzer ProVerif [15, 16] is also a resolution-based prover, and one of the most successful protocol verifiers.
Such formalizations rely on approximations. Otherwise, an accurate model such as [28] is hopeless, as far as termination is concerned. Among the approximations:
-Nonces, i.e., new names that are generated at each session of the protocol, are represented as terms, depending on the environment in which they are generated. This over-approximation is always correct as long as secrecy properties are considered. As already mentioned, for a bounded number of sessions, we can simply represent these nonces using different names. -The ordering in which messages of a given role are played is lost in the clausal translation. This can be recovered in case of a bounded number of sessions, recording and verifying the ordering of events. -Clauses are universally quantified formulas. This is fine for clauses representing the attacker's capabilities, such as
as the attacker may re-use such a construction any number of times. This might be more problematic for protocol rules as, when we use variables in place of messages (for un-analysable parts), the attacker may choose any value, but has to commit to this value: the rule should not be replayed.
This last problem is well-known in automated deduction (typically in tableau methods): we need rigid variables. While rigid variables are still universally quantified, they can get only one instance: each rigid clause can be instanciated only once and then used as many times as we wish. Using a mixture of rigid clauses and flexible clauses is therefore more accurate for the security protocols verification. This has been investigated in [38] .
We may however simply translate the rigid clauses into first-order clauses, at the price of adding new arguments, while preserving satisfiability [4] . We get in this case a faithful translation into first-order clauses of the security problem for a bounded number of sessions.
Challenge 3 Design a resolution strategy, which yields a NP-decision method for the formulas corresponding to bounded sessions protocol security.
Related work
Coming back to the over-approximated problem for an unbounded number of sessions, resolution methods are unusually successful: in many cases, the deduction process terminates. There are several works explaining this phenomenon. For instance, restrictions on the variables occurring in each protocol clause, the protocol model falls into a decidable fragment of first-order logic [34, 27, 26] . Also, assuming some tagging of (sub)messages yiedls termination [18, 48] .
Other interesting issues
They include speeding-up the deduction, relying on constraints [9] or strategies [16] or including general (user-defined) equational theories [10, 29, 17] .
Proofs of equivalences
Many security properties cannot be directly modeled in first-order logic, since they are not properties of a single execution trace. They are better stated as indistinguishability properties between two processes. Typical such examples are anonymity and (strong) secrecy; while secrecy (or confidentiality) requires a given message s to remain unknown to the attacker, strong secrecy requires that an attacker cannot learn anything about s. The latter is expressed by an indistinguishability property between the real protocol and the protocol in which s is replaced by a new name. Properties of electronic voting protocols are also typically expressed in this way [36] .
In case of equivalence properties, the deduction problem (definition 1) is replaced by deciding static equivalence: Definition 2. Two sequences of ground terms s 1 , . . . , s n and t 1 , . . . , t n are statically equivalent, which we write s 1 , . . . , s n ∼ t 1 , . . . , t n , if, for any terms u, v ∈ T (F, {x 1 , . . . , x n }),
The decision of static equivalence has been shown for several term rewriting systems [1, 32] and has been implemented for a wide class of equational theories [13, 17] .
Consider now protocols. Each role can be described by a simple sequential process, for instance in the applied π-calculus [2] and each protocol is expressed as a parallel composition of a fixed number of roles P 1 , . . . , P n (resp. Q 1 , . . . , Q n ). The security properties that we wish to consider are expressed as the observational equivalence
In words: an attacker cannot distinguish between the two versions of the protocol. The exclamation mark is a replication: we may consider any number of copies of each protocol roles. In the bounded sessions version of the problem, we simply remove the exclamation marks, and we can replace all fresh names by distinct constants. We call bounded protocols the resulting processes. As before, any interleaving τ P of actions of the process P = P 1 · · · P n corresponds to a sequence of query ⇒ response: s i ⇒ t i , for i = 1, ..., m. For any such sequence, a valid attacker on τ P consists in a substitution σ and terms ζ 0 , . . . , ζ m−1 ∈ T (F pub ∪ S 0 , {x 1 , . . . , x m−1 }) such that, for every i, ζ i θ i σ ↓= A s i+1 σ ↓, where θ i is the substitution {x 1 → t 1 , . . . , x i → t i } (the empty substitution when i = 0). This matches our definitions in section 3: ζ 0 , . . . , ζ m−1 are the recipes specifying the attacker's strategy. Now, the bounded protocols P and Q are equivalent if, for any interleaving τ P of actions of P , for any valid attacker on τ P (ζ 0 , . . . , ζ m−1 , σ), there is an interleaving τ Q of actions of Q and a substitution σ such that (ζ 0 , . . . , ζ m−1 , σ ) is a valid attacker on τ Q and t 1 σ, . . . , t m σ ∼ t 1 σ , . . . , t m σ where t 1 , . . . , t m is the sequence of responses in τ P and t 1 , . . . , t m is the sequence of responses in τ Q (and conversely, exchanging P and Q). In words: P and Q are equivalent if, whatever the attacker does, the sequence of replies from P is statically equivalent to the corresponding sequence of replies of Q.
All decision results reported in section 3 only concern the secrecy property. We would like to extend them to more security properties:
Challenge 4 In case of a bounded number of sessions, give decision and complexity results for the equivalence of protocols.
The problem is more complex than in the secrecy case, as we cannot guess first a trace and then solve a finite deducibility constraint system.
Related work
As far as we know, the only related works are -a decision result for the spi-calculus (and no equational theory) [40] and -a decision result for an approximate equivalence (implying observational equivalence) and subterm-convergent theories [12] .
Other interesting issues
If we consider an arbitrary number of sessions, in [17] , the authors design a coding of pairs of processes into bi-processes. In ProVerif, this coding itself is translated into first order-clauses, yielding automatic proofs of equivalences, for an unbounded number of sessions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only tool, which allows for automatic equivalence proofs for an unbounded number of sessions. The encoding into bi-processes requires however an approximation of bisimulation relations: two processes might be equivalent and yet there is no equivalence proof in ProVerif. An interesting open question is to find a class of protocols/properties for which the bi-process technique is complete.
Modularity
The problem of combining protocols is an important issue. Usually, several protocols may run on the same device and it is important that, once each single protocol is proved secure, they remain secure when they run concurrently. There are more reasons for studying this problem of security proofs modularity, which are coming from another area of computer science. In the area of computational security, usually related to cryptology, a huge amount of work has been devoted to universal composability [20, 41] . The idea is to get modularity theorems (called composition theorems in this context), which show that the security for one session implies the security for an unbounded number of sessions and that two secure protocols can run concurrently, without generating new attacks. However, both the composition theorems and the proofs that security primitives satisfy the hypotheses of these theorems are quite delicate in the computational world [41] . Even more, to the best of our knowledge, there is no composition result in the computational setting, which would allow some secrets (such as a pair <public key, private key>) to be shared by protocols. Using a single public key in several protocols is however a common practice (and actually desirable).
In order to get computational security guarantees, there is an alternative method: using soundness theorems in the style of [3] , the computational models are faithfully abstracted into symbolic ones. Then, proving the security at the computational level is reduced to proving a corresponding appropriate property at the symbolic level, which might be automated. There is a large body of literature on soundness theorems, which we do not review here.
Assuming appropriate soundness results, the modularity of symbolic security proofs would have therefore an important impact in the computational security community.
To be more precise, a modularity result in the symbolic setting would state that for a family of shared names n (typically the public and private keys), a class of protocols, a class of intruder deduction systems and a class of security properties, the security of two individual protocols P 1 and P 2 implies the security of the combined protocol P 1 P 2 .
Challenge 5 For which intruder deduction systems and security properties can we get modularity theorems?
Additionally, for applications to universal composability, but also in order to get decision results, we wish to get some kind of modularity of a protocol with itself: assuming that secrets such as pairs of public and private keys are shared over sessions, the security of P should imply the security of !P .
Challenge 6 For which classes of protocols, intruder theories and security properties does the security for a single session imply the security for an arbitrary number of sessions?
Related work
A recent result [31] proves a modularity theorem for a wide class of protocols. However, it only considers the secrecy property and the intruder deduction system is fixed to the simple rules of example 1 for symmetric and asymmetric encryption. Generalizing the result to equivalence properties and other intruder systems is an open question.
The proof of this result relies on several techniques from automated deduction:
-The small attack property (see section 3), -Properties of unification and deducibility constraints, -An analog of Craig's interpolation theorem for intruder deduction systems.
Concerning the challenge 6, a first result was proved by G. Lowe [43] , however for a restricted class of protocols. For instance [43] assumes that any two distinct terms headed with encryption, that occur in the protocol, are not unifiable. A similar result is shown in [6] for another class of protocols. However, in both cases, only secrecy is considered and the simple intruder deduction system is the one of example 1 (for symmetric and asymmetric encryption).
